Abstract: Physical layer security is of key interest for secure passive optical networks (PONs). We propose a hybrid chaotic confusion and diffusion (HCCD)-based encryption method for physical layer security enhancement in optical orthogonal frequency division multiplexed PONs (OFDM-PONs). Here, the real (I) and imaginary (Q) parts of OFDM symbols are separately scrambled by using different permutations before performing inverse fast Fourier transform. This scheme can realize that the transmitted quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) symbols and the symbol-to-subcarrier mapping are simultaneously changed and disrupted. The scrambling permutations are generated by an improved logistic map, whose iteration parameters are set as the security keys. 11.3-Gb/s 16 QAM and 14.1-Gb/s 32 QAM IQ scrambled OFDM signals have been successfully transmitted over 25-km standard single mode fiber in an experimental demonstration. The scrambling performance and the security of the proposed encryption scheme are further analyzed. The obtained experimental and numerical results show that the proposed HCCD-based encryption scheme has excellent resistance to illegal optical network units.
Introduction
Passive optical network (PON) is considered as a promising candidate to meet the rapidly growing bandwidth and capability requirements due to its superiorities such as cost effectiveness, low energy consumption and relatively high transmission capacity [1] . The orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM)-based access network, such as OFDM-PON and metro-access integrated network, can achieve high spectral efficiency and long reach access and thus it is a prominent candidate for next generation broadband access systems [2] , [3] . However, OFDM-PON is close to the end users and has a number of subscribers and frequent services interactions [4] , [5] . Therefore, an OFDM-PON system is especially vulnerable to various attacks and the secure problem should be taken into serious consideration [6] . So far, various technologies have been proposed to improve the security of optical access systems, including chaotic laser communication [7] , [8] , upper layers encryption [9] , [10] , and physical layer encryption [11] - [16] . However, the stability and the key distribution speed of the chaotic laser communication are limited. Upper layers encryption has relatively complicated key management and cannot protect the control data or headers. Compared with the chaotic laser communication and the upper layers encryption techniques, the physical layer encryption has flexible digital signal processing, convenient key management and low implementation complexity. Now, a few technologies have been proposed for improving the physical layer security in OFDM-PON systems, such as chaotic scrambling [11] , [12] , chaotic coding [13] , [14] , hybrid chaotic encryption [15] , and chaotic Fractional Fourier transformation [16] . However, the hybrid chaotic encryption and chaotic fractional Fourier transformation have high implementation complexity. In chaotic scrambling techniques, only the symbol-to-carrier or symbol-to-time mappings are disrupted, while the QAM symbols and the distribution of the QAM symbols are not changed, and therefore the chaotic techniques are vulnerable to the attack by statistics analyzing. In chaotic coding, the QAM symbols are rotated in the constellation and the phases of the QAM symbols are changed, while the symbol-to-carrier or symbol-to-time mappings are not disrupted. This letter proposes a hybrid chaotic confusion and diffusion (HCCD) technique for physical layer security enhancement in an OFDM-PON system. The proposed HCCD technique can simultaneously change the QAM symbols and disrupt the symbol-to-subcarrier mappings. Therefore, it can more fully scramble the transmission data and introduce higher security. The HCCD technique is realized by scrambling the real (I) and imaginary (Q) parts of the OFDM symbols separately with different permutations. The permutation matrices are generated by sorting the chaotic sequences. Owning to the properties of the chaotic map, the generated permutations have excellent performances. Furthermore, the encryption process is performed by the vector and the transformation matrix multiplication, and thus the encryption scheme has low implementation complexity. Finally, 11.3-Gb/s 16 QAM OFDM signals and 14.1-Gb/s 32 QAM OFDM signals are successfully encrypted and transmitted in an experimental demonstration.
Principle
The schematic diagram of the proposed HCCD technique based secure OFDM-PON system is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) . After serial-to-parallel (S/P) conversion and QAM mapping, the input data are first mapped to parallel QAM symbols. Next, these QAM symbols undergo the HCCD operation, where the QAM symbols and the symbol-to-subcarrier mapping are randomly changed and disrupted.
This can improve the security of the transmitted data, because the eavesdropper cannot recover the original information from the changed QAM symbols and the disrupted symbol-to-subcarrier mapping without the security keys. The operation principle of HCCD is shown in Fig. 1(b) . The I and Q parts of the parallel QAM symbols are firstly separated. Subsequently, the I and Q parts are individually scrambled by using two different permutations. The HCCD operation process can be expressed as
where
T is a vector consisting of N QAM symbols and {.} T denotes the transpose operator, Re(.) and Im(.) give the real and imaginary parts of the complex input, respectively. S I (t) and S Q (t) are two different scrambling matrices for I and Q parts of the QAM symbols column vectors, respectively. t is the discrete time index and N is the number of subcarriers. The scrambling matrices can be expressed as
where s i is the row vector. Each row vector s i in the scrambling matrix contains only one "1," and satisfies the following condition:
where "ࣹ" stands for exclusive OR (XOR) operation. The position of "1" in row vector s i denotes the position of the i th input element after scrambling
where p i is the element of the permutation {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p N }, which is generated by using a chaos map. We employ a distribution improved Logistic mapping as the chaos map, which has the following iterative formula [17] :
where x k is the system variable, and μ is the system bifurcation parameter. Compared with Logistic mapping, (5) is a uniform distribution function in the interval (0, 1) and the sequence x k has better random property. When μ ∈ (0, 1), this system enters the chaotic zone. Here, the initial iterated values {x r , r = 1, 2, . . . , R } are abandoned, where R is defined as iteration step. In our work, the initial value x 0 , the bifurcation parameter μ, and the iteration step R are set as the security keys.
To generate a corresponding scrambling permutation matrix, the security keys are pre-shared between optical network units (ONUs) and optical line terminal (OLT). The security keys are generated at each ONU separately and stored. Then they are sent to OLT within the upstream signals. After receiving the security keys, the OLT uses them to generate the scrambling permutations. The downstream signals are encrypted for different ONUs with the scrambling permutations generated by using the corresponding security keys. After receiving the encrypted downstream signals, the ONUs calculate the inverse scrambling permutations and use them to decrypt the encrypted downstream signals. The scrambling permutations are generated as follows. After iterating R + N times with the received security keys, the sequence of real numbers {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x N } can be gotten. After that, the sequence {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x N } is sorted from large to small, and the sorted sequence {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x N } can be obtained. Afterwards, we calculate the new subscript p i of the x i in the sorted sequence {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x N } and obtain a permutation {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p N }. Using the permutation {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p N }, we can obtain the scrambling matrix S I by using (2) and (4). The scrambling matrix S Q is generated by using the same way. The generated scrambling matrices S I and S Q are utilized to scramble the first OFDM symbol by using (1) . To scramble the next OFDM symbol, the iteration step R is updated to R + N to generate another pair of scrambling permutations. After HCCD operation and inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT), the time domain sample of the encrypted OFDM signal can be represent as At each ONU, the first received OFDM symbol is decrypted by using the inverse permutation sequences, which are generated with the stored security keys. After that, the iteration step R is updated to R + N so that the next OFDM symbol can also be decrypted. With the synchronization of OFDM symbols, the synchronous encryption and the decryption processes at OLT and ONUs can be successfully realized.
Experiment Setup
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed physical layer encryption method, an OFDM-PON system with two regular ONUs and one illegal ONU is considered and the experimental configuration is shown in Fig. 2 . The encrypted OFDM signal is generated offline by MATLAB, where two regular ONUs share the same subcarriers but different time-slots. First, the pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS) downstream data with a length of 2 17 − 1 experience S/P conversion and are mapped into QAM symbols. In our experiment, two different modulation formats, i.e., 16 QAM and 32 QAM, are used. After QAM mapping, the QAM symbols are encrypted by the proposed HCCD scheme. After that, the encrypted QAM symbols perform OFDM modulation. The IFFT size is 512 and 154 of the 512 subcarriers are utilized to transmit valid data. In the experiment, Hermitian symmetry is exploited to get a real OFDM signal. To resist dispersion, a cyclic prefix (CP) with 1/16 of the OFDM symbol length is added. After P/S conversion, the encrypted signal is converted to an analog signal by using an arbitrary waveform generator (Tektronix AWG7102A) with a sample rate of 10 GSa/s. The electrical waveform and spectrum are shown in Fig. 3(a) and (b) , respectively. We can see that the bandwidth of the signal is about 3 GHz. Thus the total bit rates are about 11.3 Gb/s and 14.1 Gb/s for 16 QAM mapping and 32 QAM mapping, respectively. A 1550 nm distributed feedback (DFB) laser and a Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM) are used to produce the optical signal. The optical signal is sent into the 25-km standard single mode fiber (SSMF-28) link with the launched optical power 1.5 dBm. At the receiver, the optical OFDM signal is injected into a commercial PIN photodiode (PIN-PD) with a 3-dB bandwidth of 10 GHz to realize optical-to-electrical conversion. The detected electrical OFDM signal is sampled and converted into a digital signal by using a real time sampling 
Results and Discussions

Quality of the Permutations
The permutations with good qualities can ensure diffusion property and greatly displace every element. The average displacement of all elements in a given permutation {p 1 , p 2 , p 3 , . . . , p N } is given by the shift factor which is defined by the following formula [18] :
As shown in Table I , 100 permutations with length 154 are generated by using the proposed method. The average shift factor is above 154/3, and it indicates that the generated permutations have excellent diffusion property.
Scrambling Performance
To explore the scrambling performance of the proposed scrambling scheme, we turn attention to the moved QAM symbols proportion after HCCD scrambling. Certainly, the greater proportion of the moved QAM symbols indicates the better scrambling effect. The scrambling degree (SD) is defined as [19] 
where c n (t) and w n (t) are the QAM symbols before and after scrambling, respectively. T denotes the length of discrete time. t and n are the discrete time index and the subcarrier index, respectively. Usually, SD should be over 99% to assure the security of the scrambling scheme [19] . Fig. 4 shows that SD with different time lengths and QAM orders. With the time length increasing, SDs almost are nearly stable, which are all above 99.92%. SDs of the 32 QAM symbols are greater than that of 16 QAM symbols, indicating that SD is relevant to the QAM order since a higher-order QAM modulation has more constellation points and thus there are more possible target points for the scrambling processing. We also measure the SDs of the subcarriers (SC) scrambling scheme [11] .
The results show that the SDs of SC scrambling are smaller than those of HCCD scrambling. Consequently, the performance of the HCCD scrambling is better than the SC scrambling. It should be noted that the SD can reach 100% by repeating encrypting process. However, this will increase the implementation complexity. 
Correlation Analysis
In this subsection, we investigate the correlation of the generated permutations. The correlation coefficient between pairs of permutation sequences is defined as [17] 
where u and v are the generated permutations. M is the number of the permutations and we have M = 100. E(u) and E(v) are the average values of u and v, respectively. Fig. 5 graphically shows the correlation test of the generated permutations. We can see that there is no correlation peak between any two different permutations, which indicates that the eavesdropper cannot obtain any useful information by using the incorrect permutations. The original image data have high relativity between adjacent elements. The effective scrambling scheme can greatly change the relativity. We use the proposed secure OFDM-PON system to transmit one image, as shown in Fig. 6(a) , to investigate the correlation change. Fig. 6(b) and (c) show the pictures received at an illegal ONU and a regular ONU, respectively. We can see that after HCCD scrambling, the illegal ONU cannot obtain any useful information from the received signals and the regular ONU can recover the main information from the received signals, which indicates a confidential transmission at the physical layer. We randomly choose 1000 pairs adjacent elements of the encrypted elements and the original elements, respectively, and calculate the correlation coefficient in horizontal direction of these elements by using (10) . Fig. 7 shows the correlation coefficient of the original image and the encrypted image. We can find that the correlation coefficient of the encrypted elements is reduced greatly from 0.9638 to 0.0172. Therefore, the encryption process can greatly change the relativity of the image data and resist statistical attack.
Security and Complexity Analysis
Assuming the scrambling length is N = 2 k , there are N! possible combinations for the permutation. Fig. 8 shows the number of trials needed to break the security with different scrambling length. With the length increasing, the trial number exponentially grows. Compared with SC scrambling, the trial number of HCCD scrambling of the same scrambling length is much greater. The scrambling length is N = 154, which is equal to the number of subcarriers. The exhaustive trials are 154! × 154! = 9.54 × 10 542 to break one encrypted OFDM symbol for malicious ONUs. It indicates that if the adversary only knows the encrypted OFDM symbols O(t), the original QAM symbols C(t) can barely recovered by using a number of trials. In addition, if the adversary knows the encrypted OFDM symbols O(t) and the original QAM symbols C(t), the encryption permutations can be recovered. However, the low correlation among the encryption permutations and timeslot-varying security keys can guarantee that the recovered permutations in one time slot cannot be used to decrypt the encrypted OFDM symbol in another time slot. Hence, this encryption method is resistant against the known plaintext and cipher-text attacks. Next, we consider the exhaustive search for brute-force attack from an illegal ONU. The initial values and the bifurcation parameters are set as the secret keys. Theoretically, the Logistic map has a high sensitivity to the initial values and the bifurcation parameters due to its chaos characteristics, thus the secret key space can be very large. Fig. 9 shows the sensibility of the improved Logistic map to change of the initial value x 0 . It can be noticed that, after 50 + R iterations, the two orbits generated by (5) starting from two very close initial values have completely different behaviors. So the generated permutations with these two initial values x 0 are completely different and their calculated correlation coefficient is 0.145. By adopting the double floating decimal, the secret key space is above 10 30 . Therefore, it is infeasible to break the security for each encrypted OFDM frame. Furthermore, in this scheme the encryption is performed by the vector and the transformation matrix multiplication. Owing to the characteristics of the transformation matrix, the implementation can be easily performed. In the experiment, the Intel Core I5 4590 CPU and 16G 1600MHz DDR3 memory are utilized. The HCCD scrambling process expends 0.296s, indicating that the proposed HCCD scrambling technique has low time complexity. Thus, the encryption scheme can be easily implemented with low complexity.
Measured BER Performance
In the experiment, two regular ONUs and one illegal ONU are included and they share the same subcarriers but different time slots. Both the original OFDM signals and the HCCD scrambled OFDM signals are transmitted, using two different modulation formats, i.e. 16QAM and 32QAM. The bit-error-rates (BERs) are calculated at the ONUs and the results are shown in Fig. 10 . We can see that, when the received powers are above -10.4 dBm and -6.5 dBm for 16QAM and 32QAM, respectively, the BER of the regular ONUs is below the foreword error code (FEC) limit. It indicates that the regular ONUs can recover the transmitted data. The inset (a) shows that the encrypted 16QAM OFDM signals introduce about 0.1 dB and 0.2 dB receiver sensitivity improvements at a BER of 1 0 −3 for ONU 1 and ONU 2 , respectively. This signifies that the encrypted 16QAM OFDM signal has better transmission performance than the original 16QAM OFDM signal. The received non-decrypting constellation diagram of 16QAM OFDM signal in ONU 1 is shown in inset (c) of Fig. 10 . On the other hand, the inset (b) presents that the encrypted 32QAM OFDM signal causes about 0.1 dB receiver sensitivity impairment at a BER of 10 −3 for ONU 1 and ONU 2 . This signifies that the encryption process impacts the transmission performance of the 32QAM OFDM signal. However, the transmission performance impairment is very small. The received non-decrypting constellation diagram of 32QAM OFDM signals in ONU 1 is shown in inset (d) of Fig. 10 . Compared with the traditional 32QAM constellation diagram, the encrypted 32QAM constellation diagram has four more constellation points, which is attributed to the scrambling process. These increased constellation points will improve the received optical power requirement and introduce small receiver optical power sensitivity impairment. The BER of the illegal ONU which does not have the correct security keys is about 0.5, indicating that no useful information from the downstream signal is eavesdropped. In summary, the HCCD scrambling technique can ensure that the legal ONUs can correctly recover the transmitted information and resist eavesdropping from the illegal ONU.
Conclusion
We have proposed and experimentally verified an enhanced physical layer secure strategy for an OFDM-PON system by using the HCCD scrambling technique. The proposed HCCD technique can simultaneously change the QAM symbols and disrupt the symbol-to-subcarrier mappings. The experimental results verify that the proposed scrambling scheme has excellent diffusion property and better scrambling performance. It has been verified that the proposed encryption technique can effectively prevent a variety of attacks from any illegal ONUs. Besides, owing to the simple encryption process and the properties of the chaotic map, the proposed physical layer encryption can be easily implemented with low complexity. Hence, the proposed encryption method is quite promising for security improvement in future OFDM-PON systems.
